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BOOK REVIEWS
REVUE DES LIVRES

Accidents, Compensation and the Law . By PATRICK S. ATIYAH.

London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1970. Pp.
xxviii, 633. (£6.50)
Professor P. S. Atiyah's new book is an impressive and important
work. It is not an ordinary law book; it is a "law book with a
difference", the first of a new series of such books. It places the
law in its social as well as historical context; it assesses the legal
system as a functioning organism as well as a set of rules; it
considers costs as well as logic and it contains statistics as well as
cases. The book is brightly written, well structured and glitters with
insights not only about tort and accident law, but about legal education, the judiciary, the bar and society generally in the 1970's.
It could trigger a revolution not only in our approach to accident
law, but also in legal scholarship and legal education.
One major thrust of the book is a withering yet measured
attack on the present law of torts. Picking up from such critics
as Maurice Milner,' Terence Ison2 and R. Dale Gibson,' Professor
Atiyah aims his rifle at many of the sacred cows of tort law. The
duty concept, he argues, adds nothing to the concept of negligence and may obscure the substance of the law.' The distinction between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" is rejected after
an illuminating discussion of the conflicting policies involved in
the "no liability for nonfeasance" rule.' Even the "reasonable
man" falls victim to Professor Atiyah's blistering analysis. It is
a fiction, he contends, invented to "obscure the role of the judge
as policymaker"s and it is "not very helpful" in any event." He
is no friend of foresight. In his discussion of causation and remoteness, he heaps scorn on the illusory nature of this currently
fashionable test to limit liability for negligent conduct. The author
administers lashes to several other aspects of tort law, including the

1 Negligence in Modern Law (1967) .
2 The Forensic Lottery : A Critique on Tort Liability as a System of
Personal Injury Compensation (1967) .
' A New Alphabet of Negligence, in Studies in Canadian Tort Law
(1968), p. 189.
' P. 48 .
s P. 84.
c P. 99.
" P. 96.
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lump sum method of computing damages, before concluding his
outline.
One of the major contributions of the book is his description
of the tort system in operation. Too seldom have lawyers sought
to go behind the expressed purposes of tort law to discover what
really happens. In recent years there has been some research in
the United States,' Canada' and the United Kingdom." Professor
Atiyah assembles some of the major findings of these studies and
discloses that many injured are not compensated, that most claims
are not litigated but settled, that they take a long time to conclude,
that the system is expensive to operate, and seems to have little
impact on the defendants involved . For lawyers who have not yet
informed themselves of these statistical findings, this book provides
a fine summary of the salient items.
Professor Atiyah does not stop here . He undertakes to describe and evaluate the other compensation systems in existence
in the United Kingdom-the rivals to the tort regime-such as
personal insurance and social welfare programmes . The criminal
injuries compensation plan is thoroughly discussed, both from the
legal and statistical point of view . The industrial injuries system,
he concludes, after his review of its operation, is a "superior and
more up-to-date model of a compensation system" than the tort
system on "almost every count" ." The social security system and
the other- methods of reparation like taxation, sick pay and social
services are outlined and placed in context. He concludes this
thorough analysis by blasting the waste engendered by a "plethora
of systems", their lack of coherence, double compensation and
subrogation (of which the insurance companies are the main beneficiaries) .
As Professor Atiyah begins to move toward the climax of his
book, he issues an indictment" of the fault principle composed of
six counts : (1) The compensation payable bears no relation to
the degree of fault, (2) the compensation payable bears no relation to the means of the defendant, (3) the fault principle is not
a moral principle because a defendant may be negligent without
being morally culpable, (4) the fault principle pays insufficient attention to the conduct or. needs of the plaintiff, (5) justice may
require payment of compensation without fault and (6) fault is
an unsatisfactory criterion for liability because of the difficulties
s Conard et al., Automobile Accident Costs and Payments (1964) ; Ross,
Settled Out,of Court (1970) .
' Report of The OsLoode Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of
Automobile Accidents (1965) .
" See Ison, op . cit .. footnote 2; Professor Donald Harris of Balliol College, Oxford, has conducted a study described in Hartz (1969), 119 New
L.I . 492.
" P. 386.
12
Ch . 19.
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caused in adjudicating it . The author then urges us to "move away
from the particular accident in question and survey the whole
field" . This he proceeds to do .
First, Professor Atiyah elaborates on the attempts to distinguish between accident and disease and concludes that "it is time to
jettison the distinction" ." He then demonstrates that the adminis
tration of the tort system eats up about 50% of the premiums collected, as contrasted to 3 % for sickness benefits, 10% for the industrial injuries system, and 9 % for the criminal injuries plan .
With this foundation erected, the author turns his mind to the
objectives of tort law. He observes that the popular sense of justice,
which is so often relied upon to support the tort system, is hard
to measure. Nevertheless, even if it were shown that the people
wanted it, this cannot be enough for a serious analyst. He explains
that compensation not only gives something to someone, it also
takes something away from someone else . Professor Atiyah alludes
to the wealth of a society as a vital factor in the sophistication of
its compensation system-Americans may compensate for ephemeral things such as mental suffering and privacy, whereas less
developed nations may not. Compensation may be an equivalent
for what is lost, it may be a substitute (or solace) for what is lost
or it may be given because of what the victim has never had in
comparison with others (equalization compensation) . Another
goal of tort law is loss distribution and allocation of risks, which
enables us to lighten the burden of the injured few by spreading
the costs of accidents among the many who benefit from the activity .
But tort law is more than a mere compensator. One of its functions is retribution, something that most people agree is reprehensible. And yet, suggests Professor Atiyah, "retribution in the
law of torts is on a modest scale"-it does not administer capital
punishment or flogging but merely deprives people of money. "If
this sometimes satisfies a desire for vengeance-a desire which if
unsatisfied might lead to personal vengeance-must it always be
condemned as wrong?'"" The author outlines the role of torts as
a tool of public vindication, comparing it to the Royal Commission
Inquiry, and concludes that the "occasional award of damages
against a bully or thug . . . or a finding of negligence . . . may
sometimes satisfy these desires" . He points out, however, that the
law does not place much store in it, because if a reasonable offer
is made (by payment in), the plaintiff can only proceed to the
trial if he pays his own costs as well as those of the defendant."
Tort law is supposed to deter carelessness and thereby curtail
accidents. The author advances the familiar arguments (1) that
"P. 489.
's P. 542.
'5 P. 545.
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the defendants often cannot help themselves and (2) that insurance usually pays the judgment in any event. He then states that
negligence law does not give much guidance on the precautions
people should adopt, except in a few cases. And yet, he agrees,
that there are situations where tort law can regulate conduct and
cut down the number of accidents, as in cases involving particular
professional or industrial practices. He outlines how criminal law
and administrative law bear the prime burden of the enforcement
of caution and criticises torts for its lack of precise standards. He
fails, however, to note that tort law acts as a partner to these other
fields of law by adding the threat of a civil liability sanction to
the criminal penalty in cases of violation of a statute." He also
omits to mention how sporadic and ineffectual is the enforcement
of many regulations, something that can be overcome by private
suits based on penal infractions . Professor Atiyah minimizes the
deterrent force of a rise in insurance premiums, although Professor Fleming has ruminated that this might actually be a more
effective deterrent than the threat of liability for the entire loss,
because the former must be paid while the latter cannot be in most
cases. l'
Neither does Professor Atiyah believe that tort law can deter
people from injuring themselves . If the fear of the penal sanction
and of injury to oneself cannot make people careful, he doubts
that denying them reparation, wholly or partially, will succeed
any better . He mentions the problem of lack of seat belt use and
doubts whether threatening the offenders with reduced awards will
make any difference . The fact is that seat belt use could cut dramatically the loss of life on our highways ." Governments have not
yet had the courage to invoke the criminal sanction to enforce their
general use, although they are now mandatory equipment. in all vehicles in forth America. A few in
are providing extra
coverage for those injured while wearing their belts as a kind of
incentive. Some advertising is being done, but it is not nearly
enough. Tort law should not stand idly by but should act as an
educator and as a catalyst to legislative action, as it has done recently in British Columbia . In Yuan v. Farstad," the award of a
claimant was reduced by 25 % because the victim failed to wear
an available seat belt . Although this case has not been followed in
two other provinces," it has helped to teach motorists to use their
is See, for example, Linden, Tort Liability for Criminal Nonfeasance
(1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev . 25 .
"Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law (1967), 53
Va . L. Rev . 815, at p . 825 .
"Hodson-Walker, The Value of Safety Belts : A Review (1970), 102
Can . Med . Assoc . 1 . 391 .
" (1967), 66 D .L.R . (2d) 295 (B .C .S .C.) .
20 McDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 68 D.L.R . (2d) 104 (N .S.S.C .) ; Anders
v. Sim (1970), 11 D .L .R. (3d) 366 (Alta S.C .) .
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belts and will eventually force the legislatures to resolve this
matter, hopefully by making it an offence to drive without a seat
belt .
Professor Atiyah supplies a fine analysis of the beguiling new
theory of "general deterrence", pointing out its strengths and
weaknesses, and indicating how it might be used in legislative
decision-making. This theory, developed by Professor Calabresi
of Yale University," explains that by forcing activities to bear
the costs of the accidents they generate, society will be able to
make a more informed allocation of its resources. Accident-prone
activities will cost more because of their high accident rates. Consumers or those who engage in these activities will switch to safer,
less costly substitutes. Less involvement in these dangerous activities should mean fewer accidents. Professor Atiyah argues that the
general deterrence system is far from precise, is costly, and it discriminates against the poor. Moreover, he expresses his doubt
about whether individual market decisions should be given such
free reign. Nevertheless, he concludes that it may have some
lessons for us.
All this discussion leads the author inexorably to the conclusion that the present personal injuries compensation system
is inadequate . He briefly outlines some of the major reform
proposals for automobile accident compensation . He dwells on the
more recent ones that go all the way to social insurance for all
accident victims (New Zealand Royal Commission) or for all
accident and sickness victims (Professor Ison) . Professor Atiyah
then throws up his hands and sighs, "it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that the right path for reform is to abolish the tort
system so far as personal injuries and disabilities are concerned,
and to use the money at present being poured into the tort system
to improve the social security benefits, and the social services
generally" ." Professor Atiyah advises that "a reasonable working
plan would be to bring diseases and natural disabilities and nonindustrial accidents under the industrial injuries system", even
though he recognizes that it is not a perfect programme. He does
not make the mistake of elaborating a detailed scheme of monetary
payments, the cost of which might crush the already over-burdened
taxpayer, but merely indicates that the cost of a scheme must be
carefully studied. In other words, whatever funds are saved by
abolishing tort should be transferred to the revamped social
security system on some sort of equitable basis. Some priorities
are mentioned for a start, but the author does not purport to construct a legislative scheme. Professor Atiyah offers some words of
encouragement for the insurance industry which, although it will
ai See The Costs of Accidents : A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970) .
za P. 611 .
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lose the auto insurance business, may increase its property insurance and personal accident insurance business . For the Bar, too,
the author suggests diversification of practice and holds out the
hope of increased fees for "paper work" and more legal aid work
in .the social security tribunals.
It is paradoxical to me that the author, -after jettisoning the
entire tort system in personal injury cases, recoils from doing
so in the property damage cases on the ground that "it is possible
."
that people would find this inequitable in certain circumstances"
He offers some compromises in this area to reduce the dissatisfaction of those who would be left to bear part of their own costs while
the one at fault goes free. It may just be that Professor Atiyah will
find that his entire proposal for the abolition of the personal injury suit would be found "inequitable" by most Can
It may
be that the time has arrived when New Zealanders and Englishmen are prepared to discard the tort suit and to replace it by
universal social welfare, but I doubt if that time has yet come in
Canada . In this country the federal government encountered massive resistance to such a mild reform measure as a national medicare plan. Our social welfare system is still years behind the United
Kingdom, because Canadians are not yet prepared to pay the
enormous costs involved .
Despite this apparent callousness, we Canadians have devised
a rather attractive plan for the compensation of auto accident
victims, that of "peaceful coexistence" ." In all of our provinces
those injured in car crashes receive compensation for their losses
up to a certain amount, regardless of fault. Although mandatory
only in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, the overwhelming
bulk of our motorists have purchased this coverage for a mere
$7 .00 per' vehicle. In addition, the tort action survives for those
who are entitled to avail themselves of it. It is strange that Professor Atiyah hardly touched on these exciting developments in
Canadian accident law, despite this thoroughness in' presenting
most other aspects of. the material.
There is another gap in the author's discussion . He neglects
to mention the new role for tort law that is being developed in
North America. Professor Marshall Sbapo has argued that tort law
can help to control the abuse of economic and intellectual power."
Professo rs Page" and Weiler" have shown how the police may be

P. 615 .
See Linden, Peaceful Coexistence and Automobile Accident Compensation (1966), 9 Can. Bar J . 5 ; Linden, Automobile Insurance Breakthrough in Canada (1969), 1 Transp . L.J . 171 .
25
Changing Frontiers in Torts : Vistas for the 70's (1970), 22 Stan . L.
Rev . 330 .
"Of Mace and Men : Tort Law as a Means of Controlling Domestic
Chemical Warfare (1969), 57 Georgetown L.J . 1238 .
2'
The Control of Police Arrest Practices : Reflections of a Tort Lawyer,
in Studies in Canadian Tort Law (1968), p . 416 .
23
24
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regulated by tort law. I have argued that tort law fosters the notion
of individual dignity and individual responsibility and helps to
educate our people." In the hands of a dissatisfied consumer, the
tort suit can be a useful weapon in a battle against automobile
manufacturers over a defective automobile or a defect in design,"
especially under the theory of strict liability that has been developed in the United States ." Challenges may be made to
customary practices of medical men and drug manufacturers by the
device of a tort suit." Tort law may serve as a peaceful channel
for social protest, something that we sadly lack in these tense days.
Now, perhaps such tools are not needed in England. Perhaps
the government there offers more protection to its people, but we
should hesitate long before abandoning the right to attack publicly
in a tort suit anyone who has wrongfully injured another. Consequently, although I agree with almost all of the thoughtful criticisms
of tort law made by Professor Atiyah, and although I concur that
social welfare should eventually cover all accident and sickness
victims, I do not think that tort law must be obliterated. I believe
Canada needs both tort law and better social security and I think
we will eventually be able to afford them both.
In any event, Professor Atiyah has produced a remarkable
book, some provocative analysis and a challenging proposal.
Canadian lawyers and legislators should read the book. If they
ignore it, they do so at their peril, for it will undoubtedly influence the course of accident law throughout the world in the
years ahead.
ALLEN M . LINDEN*

Compiled by LABOUR RELATIONS LAW CASEBOOK GROUP . Kingston : Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 1970.
Pp. xxxi, 585 . (Hardbound : $15 .00; paperback : $11 .00)
The arrival of a new Canadian text or casebook is generally greeted
with enthusiasm by our legal community. They will have no reason
to be disappointed with Labour Relations Law, a book which fills
a long-existing gap in the teaching of labour law.
In my opinion, the single factor which distinguishes this casebook is its organization and sequence of materials. Individual facets
Labour Relations Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary .

"Is Tort Law Relevant to the Automobile Accident Compensation
Problem (1969), 47 Texas L . Rev . 1012 .
"See, for example, the bold decision of Justice E . L . Haines in Phillips
v. Ford
Motor Co. of Canada and Elgin Motors, [19701 2 O .R . 712.
" See Linden, Products Liability in Canada, in Studies in Canadian Tort
Law (1968), p. 216 .
" See Linden, Custom in Negligence Law (1968), 11 Can . Bar J. 151 .
*Allen M . Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .

